As long as the three groups remain outside the peace process, the prospects for an end to the conflicts in Myanmar will remain uncertain. Their status has been at the heart of this process over the past five years and has led to a fragmentation of Myanmar`s ethnic armed groups, which has undermined dialogue efforts. The bilateral ceasefires, which bring the three insurgent groups into the peace process, would be an important step forward, if only because they would mean an immediate end to fighting in much of Rakhine and Shan states. However, the insistence that groups renounce territorial benefits is unrealistic, especially for the AA, and Naypyitaw should abandon them. While the 15 August attacks are a rejection of this current ceasefire proposal, they are also a step forward for the status enjoyed by most of Myanmar`s other armed groups – many of which have far less military capabilities and public support. Such recognition seems inevitable both for the parties, in order to secure bilateral ceasefires, and for the peace process, in order to move forward in a credible and legitimate manner. In the face of the provocations of the attacks, Myanmar`s army has not rehabilitated in the heaviest manner expected. Instead, it focused on securing important infrastructure and reopening the highway on the border with China. Contrary to most expectations, the army also extended its unilateral ceasefire from 31 August to 21 September. The government`s negotiating team quickly resumed discussions with the groups, with meetings taking place on August 31 and September 17. On 9 September, the Fraternal Alliance announced a month-long ceasefire, but also warned against reprisals in the event of an attack.
China, which exerts strong influence in border areas and through certain groups, has also fostered dialogue and de-escalation. One of the immediate objectives of the attacks appears to have been to reduce pressure on A.A. troops in Rakhine State – an area not covered by the army`s unilateral ceasefire and which has seen heavy fighting since January 2019 – by forcing Myanmar`s army to relocate troops to northern Shan state. But the broader goal of alliance members is to force the Myanmar army and government to accept ceasefire conditions that give groups political recognition, consolidate their territorial gains and can give them access to new economic opportunities. To this end, the attacks appear to be aimed at imposing greater Chinese intervention on behalf of the groups. Myanmar`s military responded on 21 December by declaring a unilateral ceasefire in Kachin and Shan states, which is expected to continue until 30 April 2019. The ceasefire was put to the test two weeks later, when the AA carried out coordinated attacks on police stations in the northern state of Rakhine on 4 January, killing 13 officers and triggering serious fighting. [fn] See Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.154, A New Dimension of Violence in Myanmar`s Rakhine State, 24 January 2019.Hide Footnote But the Myanmar army and government continued discussions with the three members of the Brotherhood Alliance and KIO. The army extended its unilateral ceasefire until 30 June, then again until 31 August and now a third time until 21 September. As part of the ceasefire, the government launched the Border Area Development Programme in 1989, which in 1992, as the Ministry of Progress of Border Areas and National Races, became a ministerial body and built road infrastructure, schools and hospitals in rebel-held territories.
[6] A significant attack did not happen unexpectedly. By April 2019, the groups had already warned The Myanmar army to stop offensives in Rakhine State against AA or to face joint military action. On 12 August, they reiterated the threat and announced the creation of the Fraternal Alliance, which they appeared to be founding three days later. [fn] “Why the war in Myanmar will never end,” Asia Times, August 20, 2019.Fde Footnote Not only saw the need to reduce the pressure on AA in Rakhine, but tensions between them and the government had been for some time