www.crystallake.org/Home/Components/JobPosts/Job/174/753 4 Munaretto was hired as a patrol officer by the city in 2001 and served as a police officer until his resignation on August 11, 2014. His resignation concerned his reaction to a traffic accident on May 3, 2014, in which the city concluded that he had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into a motorist involved in a car accident for driving under the influence (DUI) and allowed the motorist to leave the accident site while he was affected. On August 13, 2014, Munaretto filed a complaint pursuant to the parties` collective agreement and the matter was referred to an arbitrator to hear the dispute between the city and the Union. 5 The arbitrator partially upheld the complaint and partially challenged it. The Adjudicator concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Munaretto had not detected any physical signs of alteration of the motorist or of an alcohol smell. However, the arbitrator went on to say that Munaretto`s DUI training and 14 years of experience should have drawn his attention to the possible involvement of alcohol in a car accident after midnight. Therefore, the city had a reasonable basis for disciplining him for failing to investigate DUI. 6 The remaining question was whether termination was the appropriate sanction. The arbitrator found that the termination was an excessive sanction in the circumstances. First, it was not unreasonable for Munaretto not to immediately acknowledge the motorist`s drunkenness, and further, Munarettos tempered “the latest assessment in terms of detection and implementation of the DUI.
While it was “overall unsatisfactory” in 2009 and 2010, it improved in 2011, 2012 and 2013 and conducted “overall satisfactory” evaluations each year, with a significant improvement in the implementation of the DUI. His DUI arrest record was the second highest of seven officers from 2010 to 2013, and none of his previous discipline in detecting and executing the DUI. As a result, the arbitrator reduced the sanction of termination to a 60-day freeze. In addition, on the basis of the seriousness of the offence and disciplinary munaretto, the arbitrator also submitted a last chance order. On June 30, 2016, the City filed an application to quash the sentence in the District Court and provided a copy of the award and the arbitrator`s opinion, as well as a copy of the CBA. The City argued that the award was contrary to “well-defined and dominant public guidelines,” including strong public order against DUI, arguing that the arbitrator had overstepped its authority under the CBA. 8 The District Court heard the deportation application on February 7, 2017. There, the court rejected the city`s public order argument and found it “too broad”. It stated that there was clearly a “strong public order to deter DUI”, but, on the basis of the case law and the arguments before it, it is not satisfied that the public order against DUI applies in this case. The Tribunal went on to say that public order must be designed to be oriented towards the measures in question and “here, the acts at issue are a non-recognition of DUI. And I think it`s different from public order versus DUI in general. Although she found the city`s argument to be “well taken,” she did not find that the city provided for a clear public policy prohibiting the officer`s reinstatement from a 60-day suspension.
As a result, she denied the deportation application. 9 On 9 March 2017, following the court`s negative response to the request to expel the city, the Union applied for sanctions, legal fees and fees under Rule 137. The Union argued that sanctions against the city were appropriate because the city had not cited applicable public order, that its application was boring and without rights, and that this case was the latest in “a growing litany of cases where employers are trying to avoid arbitrators` decisions and public order arbitration decisions”.